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Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows for communication with security guaranteed by quantum
theory. The main theoretical problem in QKD is to calculate the secret key rate for a given protocol.
Analytical formulas are known for protocols with symmetries, since symmetry simplifies the analysis.
However, experimental imperfections break symmetries, hence the effect of imperfections on key rates
is difficult to estimate. Furthermore, it is an interesting question whether (intentionally) asymmetric
protocols could outperform symmetric ones. Here, we develop a robust numerical approach for
calculating the key rate for arbitrary discrete-variable QKD protocols. Ultimately this will allow
researchers to study “unstructured” protocols, that is, those that lack symmetry. Our approach relies
on transforming the key rate calculation to the dual optimization problem, which dramatically
reduces the number of parameters and hence the calculation time. We illustrate our method by
investigating some unstructured protocols for which the key rate was previously unknown.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) will play an impor-
tant role in quantum-safe cryptography, i.e., cryptogra-
phy that addresses the emerging threat of quantum com-
puters [1]. Since its original proposal [2, 3], QKD has
developed dramatically over the past three decades [4, 5],
both in theory and implementation. Indeed, QKD is
now a commercial technology, with the prospect of global
QKD networks on the horizon [6, 7].
The main theoretical problem in QKD is to calculate
how much secret key can be distributed by a given proto-
col. A crucial practical issue is that the QKD protocols
that are easiest to implement with existing optical tech-
nology do not necessarily coincide with the protocols that
are easiest to analyze theoretically [4]. Currently, calcu-
lating the secret key output of a protocol is typically
extremely technical, and hence only performed by skilled
experts. Furthermore, each new protocol idea requires a
new calculation, tailored to that protocol. Ultimately the
technical nature of these calculations combined with the
lack of universal tools limits the pace at which new QKD
protocols can be discovered and analyzed. Here, we ad-
dress this problem by developing a robust, user-friendly
framework for calculating the secret key output, with the
hope of bringing such calculations “to the masses”.
The secret key output is typically quantified by the key
rate, which refers to the number of bits of secret key es-
tablished divided by the number of distributed quantum
systems. Operationally this corresponds to the question
of how much privacy amplification Alice and Bob must
apply to transform their raw key into the final secure
key. Analytical simplifications of the key rate calculation
can be made for some special protocols that have a high
degree of symmetry [8]. Examples of such symmetric
protocols, where the signal states have a group-theoretic
structure, include the BB84 [3] and six-state protocols
[9]. Indeed the key rate is known for these protocols.
However, in practice, lack of symmetry is the rule rather
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than the exception. That is, even if experimentalists try
to implement a symmetric protocol, experimental imper-
fections tend to break symmetries [10]. Furthermore, it
is sometimes desirable due to optical hardware issues to
implement asymmetric protocols, e.g., as in Ref. [11].
We refer to general QKD protocols involving signal
states or measurement choices that lack symmetry as
“unstructured” protocols. Some recent work has made
progress in bounding the key rate for special kinds of
unstructured protocols, such as four-state protocols in
Ref. [12, 13] and qubit protocols in Ref. [14]. Still, there
is no general method for computing tight bounds on the
key rate for arbitrary unstructured protocols. Yet, these
are the protocols that are most relevant to experimental
implementations.
This motivates our present work, in which we develop
an efficient, numerical approach to calculating key rates.
Our ultimate aim is to develop a computer program,
where Alice and Bob input a description of their proto-
col (e.g., their signal states, measurement devices, sifting
procedure, and key map) and their experimental obser-
vations, and the computer outputs the key rate for their
protocol. This program would allow for any protocol,
including those that lack structure.
At the technical level, the key rate problem is an op-
timization problem, since one must minimize the well-
known entropic formula for the key rate [15] over all
states ρAB that satisfy Alice’s and Bob’s experimental
data. The main challenge here is that this optimization
problem is unreliable and inefficient. In this work, we
give a novel insight that transforming to the dual prob-
lem (e.g., see [16]) resolves these issues, hence paving the
way for automated key rate calculations.
Specifically, the unreliable (or unphysical) aspect of
the primal problem is that it is a minimization, hence
the output will in general be an upper bound on the key
rate. But one is typically more interested in reliable lower
bounds, i.e., physically achievable key rates. Transform-
ing to the dual problem allows one to formulate the prob-
lem as a maximization, and hence approach the key rate
from below. Therefore, every number outputted from
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2our computer program represents an achievable asymp-
totic key rate, even if the computer did not reach the
global maximum.
The inefficient aspect of the primal problem is that
the number of parameters grows as d2Ad
2
B for a state ρAB
with dA = dim(HA) and dB = dim(HB). For example,
if dA = dB = 10, the number of parameters that one
would have to optimize over is 10000. In contrast, in the
dual problem, the number of parameters is equal to the
number of experimental constraints that Alice and Bob
choose to impose. For example, in the generalization of
the BB84 protocol to arbitrary dimensions [17, 18], Alice
and Bob typically consider two constraints, their error
rates in the two mutually-unbiased bases (MUBs). So, for
this protocol, we have reduced the number of parameters
to something that is constant in dimension. We therefore
believe that our approach (of solving the dual problem)
is ideally suited to efficiently calculate key rates in high
dimensions.
We have written a MATLAB program to implement
our key rate calculations. To illustrate the validity of our
program, we show (see Fig. 1) that it exactly reproduces
the known theoretical dependence of the key rate on error
rate, for both the BB84 and six-state protocols.
But ultimately the strength of our approach is its abil-
ity to handle unstructured protocols. We demonstrate
this by investigating some unstructured protocols for
which the key rates were not previously known. For ex-
ample, we study a general class of protocols where Alice
and Bob measure nMUBs, with 2 6 n 6 d+1, in dimen-
sion d. Also, we investigate the B92 protocol [19], which
involves two signal states whose inner product is arbi-
trary. Our key rates are higher than known analytical
lower bounds [20, 21] for B92. Finally, we argue that our
approach typically gives dramatically higher key rates
than those obtained from an analytical approach based
on the entropic uncertainty relation [22, 23].
We focus on asymptotic key rates in this work. Nev-
ertheless, the optimization problem that we solve is also
at the heart of finite-key analysis, e.g., see Refs. [24, 25].
We therefore hope to extend our approach to the finite-
key scenario in future efforts. We remark that finite-size
effects generally reduce the key rate below its asymptotic
value.
In what follows we first present our main result: a re-
formulation of the key rate optimization problem in such
a way that it is easily computable. We then outline our
general framework for treating a broad range of protocols.
Finally we illustrate our approach with various examples.
RESULTS
Setup of the problem. Consider a general
entanglement-based (EB) QKD protocol involving finite-
dimensional quantum systems A and B that are respec-
tively received by Alice and Bob. Note that prepare-and-
measure QKD protocols can be recast as EB protocols,
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FIG. 1: Key rate for two well-known QKD protocols. Here
we compare our numerics (from Theorem 1) with the theoret-
ical curves. The results of our numerical optimization for the
BB84 and six-state protocols are respectively shown as red
and blue dots. The known theoretical curves for these proto-
cols are also shown as black dashed lines. The dots should be
viewed as reliable lower bounds on the key rate, but in this
case they happen to be perfectly tight, coinciding with the
theoretical curves.
as discussed below. For simplicity of presentation, we
consider protocols where Alice’s raw key is derived from
a measurement on her system, possibly after some post-
selection corresponding to a public announcement with a
binary outcome, “pass” or “fail”. However, our approach
can easily be extended to more general protocols.
Let ZA (ZB) denote the measurement that Alice (Bob)
performs on system A (B) in order to derive the raw key.
Suppose they use one-way direct reconciliation for the
classical post-processing and that their error correction
is optimal (i.e., leaks out the minimum number of bits),
then the asymptotic key rate is given by the Devetak-
Winter formula [15]:
K = H(ZA|E)−H(ZA|ZB) . (1)
In (1), H(X|Y ) := H(ρXY ) − H(ρY ) is the conditional
von Neumann entropy, with H(σ) := −Tr(σ log2 σ), and
ρZAZB =
∑
j,k
Tr[(ZjA ⊗ ZkB)ρAB ]|j〉〈j| ⊗ |k〉〈k|, (2)
ρZAE =
∑
j
|j〉〈j| ⊗ TrA[(ZjA ⊗ 1 )ρAE ]. (3)
Here, ρABE is the tripartite density operator shared by
Alice, Bob, and Eve (and it may be the state after some
post-selection procedure, see our general framework be-
low). Also, {ZjA} and {ZkB} are the sets of positive oper-
ator valued measure (POVM) elements associated with
Alice’s and Bob’s key-generating measurements. In what
follows we refer to {ZjA} as the key-map POVM.
3In the previous paragraph and in what follows, we as-
sume that the state shared by Alice, Bob, and Eve has
an i.i.d. (independent, identically distributed) structure,
and hence it makes sense to discuss the state ρABE associ-
ated with a single round of quantum communication. To
avoid confusion, we emphasize that our approach is “un-
structured” in the sense of lacking structure for a given
round of quantum communication, but we do impose the
i.i.d. structure that relates one round to the other rounds.
This i.i.d. structure corresponds to Eve doing a so-called
collective attack. However, the security of our derived
asymptotic key rate also holds against the most general
attacks (coherent attacks) if one imposes that the pro-
tocol involves a random permutation of the rounds (a
symmetrization step) such that the de Finetti theorem
[26, 27] or the postselection technique [28] applies.
Typically Alice’s and Bob’s shared density operator
ρAB is unknown to them. A standard part of QKD pro-
tocols is for Alice and Bob to gather data through local
measurements, and in a procedure known as parameter
estimation, they use this data to constrain the form of
ρAB . The measurements used for this purpose can, in
general, be described by bounded Hermitian operators
Γi, with the set of such operators denoted by ~Γ = {Γi}.
From their data, Alice and Bob determine the average
value of each of these measurements:
~γ = {γi}, with γi := 〈Γi〉 = Tr(ρABΓi) , (4)
and this gives a set of experimental constraints:
C = {Tr(ρABΓi) = γi}. (5)
We denote the set of density operators that are consistent
with these constraints as:
C = {ρAB ∈ PAB : C holds} (6)
where PAB denotes the set of positive semidefinite oper-
ators on HAB , and an additional constraint 〈1 〉 = 1 is
assumed to be added to the set C to enforce normaliza-
tion.
Because Alice and Bob typically do not perform full
tomography on the state, C includes many density oper-
ators, and hence the term H(ZA|E) in (1) is unknown.
To evaluate the key rate, Alice and Bob must consider
the most pessimistic of scenarios where H(ZA|E) takes
on its smallest possible value that is consistent with their
data. This is a constrained optimization problem, given
by
K = min
ρAB∈C
[H(ZA|E)−H(ZA|ZB)] (7)
where Eve’s system E can be assumed to purify ρAB since
it gives Eve the most information. Here the number of
parameters in the optimization is (dAdB)2, corresponding
to the number of parameters in a positive semidefinite
operator on HAB . We refer to (7) as the primal problem.
Main result. Our main result is a reformulation of the
optimization problem in (7).
Theorem 1: The solution of the minimization problem
in (7) is lower bounded by the following maximization
problem:
K > Θ
ln 2
−H(ZA|ZB) (8)
where
Θ := max
~λ
−∥∥∥∥∑
j
ZjAR(
~λ)ZjA
∥∥∥∥− ~λ · ~γ
 , (9)
and
R(~λ) := exp
(
−1 − ~λ · ~Γ
)
. (10)
In (9), the optimization is over all vectors ~λ = {λi},
where the λi are arbitrary real numbers and the cardi-
nality of ~λ is equal to that of ~Γ. Also, ‖M‖ denotes the
supremum norm ofM , which is the maximum eigenvalue
of M when M is positive semidefinite, as in (9).
The proof of Theorem 1 is given in the Methods sec-
tion. It relies on the duality of convex optimization prob-
lems, as well as some entropic identities that allow us to
simplify the dual problem. Note that the termH(ZA|ZB)
in (8) is pulled outside of the optimization since Alice and
Bob can compute it directly from their data.
The cardinalities of the sets ~λ and ~Γ are the same. This
means that the number of parameters λi that one must
optimize over, to solve (9), is equal to the number of ex-
perimental constraints that Alice and Bob have. (More
precisely this is the number of independent constraints,
since one can eliminate constraints that carry redundant
information). This has the potential to be significantly
less than the number of parameters in the primal prob-
lem. Indeed we demonstrate below that (9) can be easily
solved using MATLAB on a personal computer for a va-
riety of interesting QKD protocols.
Formulating constraints. For a given protocol, how
does one decide which constraints to include in the set
C? Consider the following remarks. First, adding in
more constraints will never decrease the key rate ob-
tained from our optimization. This follows since adding
a new constraint gives an additional λi to maximize over,
while setting this new λi to zero recovers the old prob-
lem. Second, coarse-graining constraints, i.e., merging
two constraints 〈Γi〉 = γi and 〈Γj〉 = γj into a single
constraint 〈Γi + Γj〉 = γi + γj , will never increase the
key rate obtained from our optimization. This follows
since merging two constraints means that two λi’s are
merged into a single λi, thus restricting the optimiza-
tion. Hence, to obtain the highest key rates, one should
input all of one’s refined knowledge that is available into
our optimization. On the other hand, coarse-graining re-
duces the number of constraints and thus may help to
simplify the optimization problem, possibly at the cost
of a reduced key rate.
4One’s refined knowledge is captured as follows. In a
general EB protocol, Alice measures a POVM (whose
elements may be non-commuting, e.g., if she randomly
measures one of two MUBs), which we denote as ΓA =
{ΓA,i}. Likewise Bob’s corresponding POVM is ΓB =
{ΓB,i}. Hence, through public discussion, Alice and Bob
obtain knowledge of expectation values of the form
Tr [ρAB(ΓA,i ⊗ ΓB,j)] = γij , for each i, j . (11)
These constraints form the set C in (5). We remark that
it is common in the QKD field to express correlations in
terms of average error rates rather than in terms of the
joint probability distribution in (11). This is an exam-
ple of the coarse-graining that we mentioned above. For
simplicity of presentation, we will do this sort of coarse-
graining for some protocols that we investigate below,
although (11) represents our general framework for con-
structing C.
Framework for prepare-and-measure. While our
approach is stated in the EB scenario, let us note how
it applies to prepare-and-measure (PM) protocols. Con-
sider a PM protocol involving a set of N signal states
{|φj〉}, which Alice sends with probabilities {pj}. It
is well-known that PM protocols can be recast as EB
protocols using the source-replacement scheme (see, e.g.,
[4, 8, 29]). Namely, one forms the entangled state:
|ψAA′〉 =
∑
j
√
pj |j〉|φj〉. (12)
One imagines that Alice keeps system A, while system
A′ is sent over an insecure quantum channel E to Bob,
resulting in
ρAB = (I ⊗ E)(|ψAA′〉〈ψAA′ |). (13)
The numerical optimization approach described above
can then be applied to the state ρAB in (13). However,
in addition to the constraints obtained from Alice’s and
Bob’s measurement results, we must add in further con-
straints to account for the special form of ρAB . In par-
ticular, note that the partial trace over B gives
ρA =
∑
j,k
√
pjpk〈φk|φj〉|j〉〈k|. (14)
The form of ρA, which is closely related to Gram matrix,
depends on the inner products between the signal states,
which (we assume) Alice knows. Suppose {Ωi} is a set of
tomographically complete observables on system A, then
one can add in the calculated expectation values {ωi} of
these observables into the set of constraints. That is, add
〈Ωi ⊗ 1 〉 = ωi, for each i (15)
to the set C in (5). This will capture Alice’s knowledge
of her reduced density operator.
Framework for decoy states. In decoy-state QKD
[30], which aims to combat photon-number splitting at-
tacks, Alice prepares coherent states of various intensities
and then randomizes their phases before sending them to
Bob. Our framework can handle decoy states simply by
allowing for additional signal states to be added to the
set {|φj〉} in (12). For example, to treat decoy protocols
with partial phase randomization [31], one can consider
signal states that are bipartite (on the signal mode S and
the reference mode R) of the form
|φjkl〉 = |αjei(θk+φl)〉S ⊗ |αjeiθk〉R (16)
where αj is the amplitude of the coherent state associ-
ated with the j-th intensity setting, θk is the k-th phase
used in phase randomization, and φl is the phase Alice
uses to encode her information (e.g., for generating key).
Decoy protocols with complete phase randomization are
also treatable in our framework, namely, by adding in a
signal state for each photon-number basis state (up to a
cut-off), and treating multi-photon signals as orthogonal
states (so-called “tagged states”) since Eve can perfectly
distinguish them.
Framework for MDI QKD. A special kind of PM pro-
tocol is measurement-device-independent (MDI) QKD
[32]. In MDI QKD, Alice prepares states {|φj〉} with
probabilities {pj} and sends them to Charlie, and Bob
does the same procedure as Alice (see Fig. 2). Char-
lie typically does a Bell-basis measurement, however the
security proof does not assume this particular form of
measurement. Charlie announces the outcome of his
measurement, which we denote by the classical regis-
ter M . Our framework for treating MDI QKD con-
siders the tripartite state ρABM , where A and B re-
spectively are Alice’s and Bob’s systems in the source-
replacement scheme, playing the same role as system A
in (12) (see Supplementary Note 1 for elaboration). For
our numerics, we impose the constraint that the marginal
ρAB = ρA ⊗ ρB is fixed (since Eve cannot access A and
B), with ρA and ρB given by the form in (14). We en-
force this constraint using the same approach as used in
(15) to fix ρA for PM protocols. The only other con-
straints we impose are the usual correlation constraints,
i.e., a description of the joint probability distribution for
the standard bases on A, B, and M , of the form
Tr [ρABM (|j〉〈j| ⊗ |k〉〈k| ⊗ |m〉〈m|)] = γjkm . (17)
Framework for post-selection and announce-
ments. In general, a QKD protocol may involve post-
selection. As an example, if Alice sends photons to Bob
over a lossy channel, then they may post-select on rounds
in which Bob detects a photon. As noted above, for sim-
plicity we consider protocols where the post-selection in-
volves a binary announcement, and Alice and Bob keep
(discard) rounds when “pass” (“fail”) is announced. Let G
be the completely-positive (CP) linear map correspond-
ing to the post-selection. The action of G(·) = G(·)G† is
5given by a single Kraus operator G, corresponding to the
“pass” announcement.
The key rate formula (1) should be applied to the post-
selected state:
ρ˜AB = G(ρAB)/ppass (18)
where ppass = Tr(G(ρAB)) is the probability for passing
the post-selection filter. We remark that since G is given
by a single Kraus operator, it maps pure states to pure
states, and hence taking Eve’s system to purify the post-
selected state ρ˜AB is equivalent to taking it to purify ρAB .
Hence applying the key rate formula to ρ˜AB does not give
Eve access to any more than she already has, and hence
does not introduce any looseness into our bound. Future
extension of our work to more general maps G will need
to carefully account for how Eve’s system is affected by
G, so as not to lose key rate from this proof technique.
The only issue is that Alice’s and Bob’s experimen-
tal constraints C in (5) are still in terms of state ρAB .
To solve for the key rate, one must transform these con-
straints into constraints on ρ˜AB . For the special case
where G has an inverse G−1 that is also CP, one can
simply insert the identity channel I = G−1G into the
expression Tr(ρABΓi) = Tr(G−1G(ρAB)Γi). Using cyclic
permutation under the trace, we transform (5) into a set
of constraints on ρ˜AB ,
C˜ = {Tr(ρ˜ABΓ˜i) = γ˜i}. (19)
where the Γ˜i = (G−1)†(Γi) are Hermitian operators, with
(G−1)† being the adjoint of G−1, and γ˜i = γi/ppass. Note
that ppass is determined experimentally and hence the γ˜i
are known to Alice and Bob. More generally, we provide
a method for obtaining C˜ for arbitrary G, as described
in Supplementary Note 2.
We remark that public announcements can be treated
with a simple extension of our post-selection framework.
While our framework directly applies to announcements
with only two outcomes corresponding to “pass” or “fail”
(as discussed above), more general announcements can
be treated by adding classical registers that store the an-
nouncement outcomes. Our treatment of MDI QKD is
an example of this approach (see Fig. 2 and Supplemen-
tary Note 1). Additional examples that could be treated
in this way are protocols with two-way classical commu-
nication [33] such as advantage distillation.
Outline of examples. We now illustrate our numerical
approach for lower bounding the key rate by considering
some well-known protocols. First, we consider the BB84
and six-state protocols (Fig. 1), MDI QKD with BB84
states (Fig. 2), and the generalized BB84 protocol involv-
ing two MUBs in any dimension (Fig. 3). In each case,
the dependence of the key rate on error rate is known,
and we show that our numerical approach exactly repro-
duces these theoretical dependences. After considering
these structured protocols, we move on to using our nu-
merical optimization for its intended purpose: studying
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FIG. 2: Key rate for MDI QKD with the BB84 signal states.
The inset shows the basic idea of MDI QKD: Alice and Bob
each prepare a signal state and send it to an untrusted node,
which performs an (untrusted) Bell-basis measurement and
announces the outcome. Our numerics (circular dots) essen-
tially reproduce the known theoretical dependence of the key
rate on the error rate (dashed curve), which is the same ex-
pression as that given in (20). See Supplementary Note 1 for
elaboration.
unstructured protocols. The fact that our bound is tight
for the structured protocols mentioned above gives reason
to suspect that we will get strong bounds in the unstruc-
tured case. We investigate below a protocol involving n
MUBs, a protocol involving bases with arbitrary angle
between them, and the B92 protocol.
Example: BB84. Consider an entanglement-based ver-
sion of the BB84 protocol [3], where Alice and Bob each
receive a qubit and measure either in the Z = {|0〉, |1〉}
or X = {|+〉, |−〉} basis, where |±〉 = (|0〉± |1〉)/√2. For
all protocols that we discuss, we assume perfect sifting
efficiency, which can be accomplished asymptotically via
asymmetric basis choice [34]. Let us suppose that Alice
and Bob each use their Z basis in order to generate key.
For simplicity, suppose they observe that their error rates
in the Z and X bases are identical and equal to Q, then
it is known (see, e.g., [4]) that the key rate is given by
K = 1− 2h(Q) (20)
where h(p) := −p log2 p− (1−p) log2(1−p) is the binary
entropy.
To reproduce this result using our numerics, we write
the optimization problem as follows:
Key-map POVM: ZA = {|0〉〈0|, |1〉〈1|} (21)
Constraints: 〈1 〉 = 1 (22)
〈EX〉 = Q (23)
〈EZ〉 = Q (24)
6where the error operators are defined as
EZ := |0〉〈0| ⊗ |1〉〈1|+ |1〉〈1| ⊗ |0〉〈0| (25)
EX := |+〉〈+| ⊗ |−〉〈−|+ |−〉〈−| ⊗ |+〉〈+|. (26)
Equations (21)-(24) highlight the fact that, as far as the
optimization in (9) is concerned, a QKD protocol is de-
fined by the POVM elements used for generating the key
and the experimental constraints used for “parameter es-
timation” (and also the post-selection map G, but this is
trivial for the ideal BB84 protocol.). Once these things
are specified, the protocol is defined and the key rate is
determined. Numerically solving the problem defined in
(21)-(24) for several values of Q leads to the red dots in
Fig. 1, which agree perfectly with the theory curve.
Example: Six state. Now consider an entanglement-
based version of the six-state protocol, where Alice and
Bob each measure one of three MUBs (X, Y , or Z) on
their qubit. Suppose that Alice and Bob observe that
their error rates in all three bases are identical, 〈EX〉 =
〈EY 〉 = 〈EZ〉 = Q, where
EY := |y+〉〈y+| ⊗ |y+〉〈y+|+ |y−〉〈y−| ⊗ |y−〉〈y−| , (27)
with |y±〉 = (|0〉±i|1〉)/
√
2. (Our definition of EY reflects
the fact that the standard Bell state is correlated in Z
andX but anti-correlated in Y .) To reproduce the known
key rate [9, 21], we write the optimization problem as:
Key-map POVM: ZA = {|0〉〈0|, |1〉〈1|} (28)
Constraints: 〈1 〉 = 1 (29)
〈EXY 〉 = Q (30)
〈EZ〉 = Q , (31)
where EXY := (EX +EY )/2 quantifies the average error
for X and Y . Note that the constraint 〈EXY 〉 = Q is ob-
tained by coarse-graining the individual error rates. In
theory, one can get a stronger bound on the key rate by
splitting up this constraint into 〈EX〉 = Q and 〈EY 〉 = Q.
However, our numerics show that this does not improve
the key rate, and the constraints in (29)-(31) are enough
to reproduce the theory curve. Indeed, numerically solv-
ing the problem in (28)-(31) leads to the blue dots in
Fig. 1, which agree with the theory curve.
Example: Two MUBs in higher dimensions. A dis-
tinct advantage of our approach of solving (9) instead of
the primal problem (7) is that we can easily perform the
optimization in higher dimensions, where the number of
parameters in (7) would be quite large. To illustrate this,
we consider a generalization of BB84 to arbitrary dimen-
sion, where Alice and Bob measure generalized versions of
the X and Z bases. This protocol has been implemented,
e.g., in Ref. [18] using orbital angular momentum. Tak-
ing Z as the standard basis {|j〉}, Alice’s X basis can be
taken as the Fourier transform {F |j〉}, where
F =
∑
j,k
ω−jk√
d
|j〉〈k| (32)
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FIG. 3: Higher dimensional analog of BB84, using two MUBs.
This plot shows the theoretical key rate as solid curves, and
the result of our numerical optimization as circular dots, for
dA = dB = d, with d = 6 (blue), d = 8 (red), and d = 10
(black). Again, the dots should be viewed as reliable lower
bounds, but in this case they are perfectly tight.
is the Fourier matrix, with ω = e2pii/d, and for simplic-
ity we choose Alice’s and Bob’s dimension to be equal:
dA = dB = d. Bob’s X basis is set to {F ∗|j〉}, where F ∗
denotes the conjugate of F in the standard basis.
Suppose that Alice and Bob observe that their error
rates in Z and X are identical. The theoretical key rates
[8, 17] for the cases d = 6, 8, 10 are shown as dashed
curves in Fig. 3, while our numerics are shown as circular
dots. Clearly there is perfect agreement with the theory.
For our numerics we employ the same constraints as
used for BB84 in (21)-(24), but generalized to higher d.
We again emphasize that the calculation of Θ here is very
efficient and can easily handle higher dimension. This
is because the number of parameters one is optimizing
over is independent of dimension - equal to the number
of constraints, which in this case is 3. This is in sharp
contrast to the primal problem in (7), where the number
of parameters is d4, which would be 10000 for d = 10.
Example: n MUBs. A simple generalization of the
above protocols is to consider a set of n MUBs in di-
mension d. For example, in prime power dimensions
there exist explicit constructions for sets of nMUBs with
2 6 n 6 d+ 1 [35]. Consider a protocol where we fix the
set of n MUBs, and in each round, Alice and Bob each
measure their d dimensional system in one basis chosen
from this set. For general n the symmetry group is not
known for this protocol [8], so one can consider it an un-
structured protocol. Indeed, only for the special cases
n = 2 and n = d + 1 do we have analytical formulas for
the key rate [8]. Nevertheless it is straightforward to ap-
ply our numerics to this protocol for any n. Our results
are shown in Fig. 4 for d = 5. To obtain these curves
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FIG. 4: Protocol where Alice and Bob each use n MUBs.
The key rate is plotted for various n ∈ {2, 3, 4, 5, 6} and for
dA = dB = 5. This is an unstructured protocol, since for
intermediate values of n the symmetry group and hence the
key rate is unknown. However, our numerics provides the
dependence of key rate on error rate for any n, as shown.
The inset shows the error tolerance - the smallest error rate
that makes the key rate vanish - as a function of n. Note that
the largest jump in the error tolerance occurs from n = 2 to
n = 3.
we only need three constraints, which are analogous to
(29)-(31), but generalized such that 〈EXY 〉 is replaced
by the average error rate in all n−1 bases, excluding the
basis used for key generation (the Z basis).
Interestingly, Fig. 4 shows that just adding one basis,
going from n = 2 to n = 3, gives a large jump in the key
rate, whereas there are diminishing returns as one adds
more bases. This can be seen in the inset of Fig. 4, which
plots the error tolerance (i.e., the value of Q for which
the key rate goes to zero) as a function of n. We have
seen similar behavior for other d besides d = 5. After
completion of this work, an analytical formula for n = 3
was discovered [36], and we have verified that it agrees
perfectly with our numerics.
In Supplementary Note 3, we analytically prove the
following.
Proposition 2: Our numerical results are perfectly tight
for the protocols discussed in Figs. 1, 3, and 4. That is,
for these protocols, our optimization exactly reproduces
the primal optimization (7).
Note that this observation implies that key rate for
protocols involving n MUBs (as in Fig. 4) is now known;
namely it is given by our numerical optimization.
Example: Arbitrary angle between bases. While
MUBs are a special case, our approach can handle arbi-
trary angles between the different measurements or signal
states. For example, we consider a simple qubit protocol
[37] where Alice and Bob each measure either the Z or
W basis, where W is rotated by an angle θ away from
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FIG. 5: Protocol where Alice and Bob each measure Z or W .
Here Z is the standard basis and theW basis is rotated by an
angle θ away from the X basis. The key rate versus θ is shown
with the error rate set to Q = 0.01. Our numerics give a
hierarchy of four lower bounds on the key rate, corresponding
to adding in additional constraints from (33)-(37). All of our
bounds are tighter than the bound obtained from the entropic
uncertainty principle. The plot indicates that the uncertainty
principle gives a dramatically pessimistic key rate, much lower
than the true key rate of the protocol.
the ideal X basis. This protocol provides the opportu-
nity to compare our numerical approach to an analytical
approach based on the entropic uncertainty principle, in-
troduced in Refs. [22, 23]. This is the state-of-the-art
method for lower bounding the key rate. So for compar-
ison, Fig. 5 plots the bound obtained from the entropic
uncertainty principle for bases Z and W .
We apply our numerical approach with the constraints:
Constraints: 〈1 〉 = 1 (33)
〈σW ⊗ σW 〉 = 1− 2Q (34)
〈σZ ⊗ σZ〉 = 1− 2Q (35)
〈σZ ⊗ σW 〉 = (sin θ)(1− 2Q) (36)
〈σW ⊗ σZ〉 = (sin θ)(1− 2Q), (37)
where σZ and σW are the Pauli operators associated with
the Z and W bases. Fig. 5 plots a hierarchy of lower
bounds obtained from gradually adding in more of the
constraints in (33)-(37). As the plot shows, we already
beat the entropic uncertainty principle with only the first
two constraints. Furthermore, adding in all these con-
straints gives a dramatically higher bound, showing the
uncertainty principle gives highly pessimistic key rates
for this protocol. From an experimental perspective,
Fig. 5 is reassuring, in that small variations in θ away
from the ideal BB84 protocol (θ = 0) have essentially no
effect on the key rate. Fig. 5 also highlights the fact that
our approach allows us to systematically study the effect
on the key rate of Alice and Bob using more or less of
their data. In this example, we see that it is useful to
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FIG. 6: The B92 protocol. The key rate (in bits per pho-
ton sent by Ailce) is plotted versus the Bloch-sphere angle
between the two signal states. Curves are shown for various
values of the depolarizing probability p.
keep data that one will usually discard in the sifting step
of the protocol.
Example: B92. Next we consider the B92 protocol
[19], which is a simple, practical, unstructured proto-
col. It nicely illustrates our framework because it is in-
herently a prepare-and-measure protocol and it involves
post-selection. In the protocol, Alice sends one of two
non-orthogonal states {|φ0〉, |φ1〉} to Bob. Since the
Bloch-sphere angle θ between the two states is arbitrary,
with 〈φ0|φ1〉 = cos(θ/2), the protocol is unstructured.
Bob randomly (with equal probability) measures either
in basis B0 = {|φ0〉, |φ0〉} or basis B1 = {|φ1〉, |φ1〉},
where 〈φ0|φ0〉 = 〈φ1|φ1〉 = 0. If Bob gets outcome |φ0〉
or |φ1〉, then he publicly announces “pass”, and he assigns
a bit value of 1 or 0, respectively, to his key. Otherwise,
Bob announces “fail” and they discard the round.
A detailed description of the constraints we employed
for B92 can be found in Supplementary Note 4. Our
numerical results are shown in Fig. 6. Fig. 6 shows that
the optimal angle for maximizing key rate depends on
the depolarizing noise p, although small deviations ±5◦
from the optimal angle do not affect the key rate much.
Our results give higher key rates for B92 than Refs. [20]
and [21], which respectively predicted positive key rates
for p 6 0.034 and p 6 0.048, while we predict it for
p 6 0.053. On the other hand, Ref. [38] directly solved
the primal problem (7) for B92 by brute-force numer-
ics, and achieves positive key rate for p 6 0.065. We
have verified that the gap between our results and those
of Ref. [38] is due to the looseness of our usage of the
Golden-Thompson inequality (see Eq. (60) in the Meth-
ods section). However, Ref. [38] only showed a plot for
p > 0.046, noting that the numerical optimization for
the primal problem did not converge for smaller p val-
ues. This highlights a benefit of going to the dual prob-
lem, in that we have no trouble with obtaining the full
dependence on p.
DISCUSSION
In conclusion, we address one of the main outstand-
ing problems in QKD theory: how to calculate key rates
for arbitrary protocols. Our main result is a numerical
method for lower-bounding key rates that is both effi-
cient and reliable. It is reliable in the sense that, by
reformulating the problem as a maximization, every so-
lution that one’s computer outputs is an achievable key
rate. It is efficient in the sense that we have reduced the
number of parameters in the optimization problem from
d2Ad
2
B down to the number of experimental constraints,
which in some cases is independent of dimension.
The motivation for our work is two-fold. First, exper-
imental imperfections tend to break symmetries, so the-
oretical techniques that exploit symmetries do not ap-
ply. Hence there is no general method currently avail-
able for calculating the effect of imperfections on the key
rate. Second, it is interesting to ask whether protocols
that are intentionally designed to lack symmetry might
outperform the well-known symmetric protocols. Such a
question cannot be posed without a method for calcu-
lating key rates for unstructured protocols. Just to give
an example where the key rate is currently unknown, we
plan to apply our approach to protocols where a small,
discrete set of coherent states are the signal states and
information is encoded in the phase [39].
We envision that our method could be a standard tool
for QKD researchers. In future work we hope to extend
our approach to the finite-key scenario. Indeed, the op-
timization problem we solve is closely related to one ap-
pearing in finite-key analysis [24].
METHODS
Outline. Here we prove our main result, Theorem 1.
Our proof relies on several technical tools. First is the no-
tion of the duality of optimization, i.e., transforming the
primal problem to its dual problem. Second, we employ
several entropic identities to simplify the dual problem.
Third, we use a recent, important result from Ref. [40]
that solves a relative entropy optimization problem.
For readability, we prove Theorem 1 here for the spe-
cial case where the key-map POVM ZA = {ZjA} is a pro-
jective measurement, i.e., where the ZjA are projectors
(of arbitrary rank). We postpone the proof for arbitrary
POVMs to Supplementary Note 5.
The primal problem. First we rewrite (7) as:
K =
[
min
ρAB∈C
H(ZA|E)
]
−H(ZA|ZB) , (38)
9noting that the second term in (38), H(ZA|ZB), will be
determined experimentally and hence can be pulled out
of the optimization. We remark that, simply for illustra-
tion purposes we used Fano’s inequality to upper-bound
H(ZA|ZB) in our figures; however, in practice H(ZA|ZB)
would be directly calculated from the data.
Since we only need to optimize the first term, we rede-
fine the primal problem as
α := min
ρAB∈C
H(ZA|E) , (39)
and note that we can take E to be a purifying system of
ρAB , since that gives Eve the most information. Next we
use a result for tripartite pure states ρABE = |ψ〉〈ψ|ABE
from Refs. [41, 42] that relates the conditional entropy to
the relative entropy:
H(ZA|E) = D
(
ρAB
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∑
j
ZjAρABZ
j
A
)
(40)
where the relative entropy is defined by
D(σ||τ) := Tr(σ log2 σ)− Tr(σ log2 τ). (41)
We remark that the joint convexity of the relative en-
tropy implies that the right-hand side of (40) is a convex
function of ρAB . (See [43] for an alternative proof of con-
vexity.) Because of this, and the fact that the constraints
in (5) are linear functions of ρAB , (39) is a convex opti-
mization problem [16].
It is interesting to point out the connection to co-
herence [44]. For some set of orthogonal projectors
Π = {Πj} that decompose the identity, ∑j Πj = 1 ,
the coherence (sometimes called relative entropy of co-
herence) of state ρ is defined as [44]:
Φ(ρ,Π) = D
(
ρ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∑
j
ΠjρΠj
)
. (42)
Rewriting the primal problem in terms of coherence gives
α = min
ρAB∈C
Φ(ρAB , ZA) . (43)
Hence we make the connection that calculating the secret
key rate is related to optimizing the coherence.
This observation is important since the coherence is
a continuous function of ρ (see Supplementary Note 6).
This allows us to argue in Supplementary Note 6 that our
optimization problem satisfies the strong duality criterion
[16], which means that the solution of the dual problem
is precisely equal to that of primal problem.
The dual problem. Now we transform to the dual
problem. Due to a pesky factor of ln(2), it is useful to
rescale the primal problem as follows:
α̂ := α ln(2) = min
ρAB∈C
Φ̂(ρAB , ZA) (44)
where, henceforth, we generally use the notation M̂ :=
M ln(2), for any quantity M . The dual problem [16] of
(44) is given by the following unconstrained optimization:
β̂ = max
~λ
min
ρAB∈P
L(ρAB , ~λ) (45)
where P is the set of positive semidefinite operators:
P = {ρAB ∈ HdAdB : ρAB > 0}. (46)
Here the Lagrangian is given by
L(ρAB , ~λ) := Φ̂(ρAB , ZA) +
∑
i
λi[Tr(ρABΓi)− γi] ,
(47)
where the ~λ = {λi} are Lagrange multipliers. Strong
duality implies that
β̂ = α̂ . (48)
In what follows, we go through several steps to simplify
the dual problem. It helps to first state the following
lemma.
Lemma 3: [42, 45] For any ρ and Π = {Πj}, the coher-
ence can be rewritten as
Φ(ρ,Π) = min
ω∈D
D
(
ρ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∑
j
ΠjωΠj
)
(49)
where D is the set of density operators.
Hence we have
Φ̂(ρAB , ZA) = min
σAB∈D
D̂
(
ρAB ||ZA(σAB)
)
, (50)
where we define the quantum channel ZA whose action
on an operator O is given by
ZA(O) :=
∑
j
ZjAOZ
j
A . (51)
Next, we interchange the two minimizations in (45)
min
ρAB∈P
min
σAB∈D
f(ρAB , σAB , ~λ)
= min
σAB∈D
min
ρAB∈P
f(ρAB , σAB , ~λ) (52)
where
f(ρAB , σAB , ~λ) := D̂
(
ρAB ||ZA(σAB)
)
+
∑
i
λi(〈Γi〉 − γi). (53)
Ref. [40] solved a relative entropy optimization prob-
lem, a special case of which is our problem:
min
ρAB∈P
f(ρAB , σAB , ~λ) . (54)
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From [40], the unique solution of (54) is
ρ∗AB = exp
(
− 1 − ~λ · ~Γ + ln (ZA(σAB))) . (55)
Inserting (55) into (53) gives the optimal value:
f(ρ∗AB , σAB , ~λ) = −Tr(ρ∗AB)−
∑
i
λiγi . (56)
In summary the dual problem becomes
β̂ = max
~λ
η(~λ) , (57)
with
η(~λ) := − max
σAB∈D
[
Tr(ρ∗AB) + ~λ · ~γ
]
. (58)
A lower bound. We can obtain a simple lower bound on
η(~λ) as follows. The Golden-Thompson inequality states
that
Tr(exp(A+B)) 6 Tr(exp(A) exp(B)). (59)
Applying this inequality gives:
Tr(ρ∗AB) 6 Tr
(
R(~λ) exp
(
lnZA(σAB)
))
(60)
= Tr
(
R(~λ)ZA(σAB)
)
(61)
= Tr
(
ZA
(
R(~λ)
)
σAB
)
, (62)
where R(~λ) = exp
(−1 −~λ ·~Γ) was defined in (10). Next,
note that
max
σAB∈D
Tr
(
ZA
(
R(~λ)
)
σAB
)
=
∥∥∥ZA(R(~λ))∥∥∥ . (63)
Hence, we arrive at our final result
β̂ > max
~λ
[
−
∥∥∥ZA(R(~λ))∥∥∥− ~λ · ~γ] , (64)
where the right-hand side is denoted as Θ in Theorem 1.
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SUPPLEMENTARY NOTE 1: MDI QKD
In the Results section, we outlined our framework for handling MDI QKD protocols. Here we elaborate on this
framework, and we also give more details on the example calculation shown in Fig. 2.
Framework for MDI QKD (continued)
Our framework considers the tripartite state ρABM , where A and B are respectively the systems held by Alice and
Bob in the source-replacement scheme, and M is the classical register that stores the outcome of the measurement
performed by the untrusted node. Let us elaborate on the origin of ρABM . Recall that, in the source-replacement
scheme, Alice prepares a bipartite entangled state of the form
|ψAA′〉 =
∑
j
√
pj |j〉|φj〉, (65)
and in the MDI scenario, Bob prepares a similar state
|ψBB′〉 =
∑
j
√
pj |j〉|φj〉 . (66)
Hence, the initial state (prior to the action of Eve) is
ρ
(0)
AA′BB′ := |ψAA′〉〈ψAA′ | ⊗ |ψBB′〉〈ψBB′ | . (67)
For notational convenience, it is helpful to permute the order of the subsystems, as follows
ρ˜
(0)
ABA′B′ := F
(
ρ
(0)
AA′BB′
)
, (68)
where F is the quantum channel that switches the ordering of subsystems A′ and B.
Now note that Eve only has access to A′B′ and not AB. Likewise the untrusted node performs a measurement only
on A′B′, while A and B remain respectively in Alice’s and Bob’s laboratories. We combine the action of Eve together
with the action of the untrusted measurement, and model it as a single quantum channel E that maps A′B′ → M ,
where M is a classical register. That is, we obtain the state
ρABM =
(
IAB ⊗ E
)(
ρ˜
(0)
ABA′B′
)
, (69)
where IAB is the identity channel on AB. We apply our numerical approach to the state ρABM in Supplementary
Eq. (69). The beauty of the MDI protocol is that we do not need to consider the process of how we arrived at the
state ρABM , i.e., we do not need to discuss the details of the channel E . We only need to specify the experimental
constraints on ρABM , which we stated in the Results section (although we repeat them here for convenience),
Tr [ρABM (|j〉〈j| ⊗ |k〉〈k| ⊗ |m〉〈m|)] = γjkm . (70)
In addition, we also enforce constraints that fix the form of the marginal ρAB , which has the form
ρAB = ρA ⊗ ρB =
∑
j,k
√
pjpk〈φk|φj〉|j〉〈k|
⊗
∑
j,k
√
pjpk〈φk|φj〉|j〉〈k|
 . (71)
One could also add constraints that enforce that M is a classical system. However, we choose not to do this for
the following reason. The worst-case scenario, i.e., the scenario that gives Eve the most information, corresponds to
M being classical, and hence the key rate is not improved by enforcing the classicality of M . We state this in the
following lemma.
Lemma 4: Let {|m〉} be the standard basis for system M , and let M be the quantum channel that diagonalizes
(i.e., decoheres) system M in this basis. That is,M(O) = ∑m |m〉〈m|O|m〉〈m| for any operator O. Consider a set of
constraints C on ρABM and let C denote the set of density operators ρABM that satisfy C. Suppose that the constraints
C do not preclude M from being decohered in the standard basis, i.e., if ρABM ∈ C, then (IAB ⊗M)(ρABM ) ∈ C.
Define the set
CM := {ρABM ∈ C : (IAB ⊗M)(ρABM ) = ρABM} . (72)
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In other words, CM ⊆ C is the set of states in C that are diagonal in the standard basis on M . Then, Eve’s ignorance
about Alice’s key is the same regardless of whether we impose that M is decohered in the standard basis, i.e.,
min
ρABM∈C
H(ZA|E) = min
ρABM∈CM
H(ZA|E) . (73)
Proof. For notational simplicity we drop the subscript A from ZA in what follows. Since CM ⊆ C, then we obviously
have
min
ρABM∈C
H(Z|E) 6 min
ρABM∈CM
H(Z|E) , (74)
so we just need to show the inequality in the opposite direction. In particular we will show that for each state in C
there is a corresponding state in CM where Eve’s ignorance is lower. Let ρABM ∈ C, then
ρ˜ABM := (IAB ⊗M)(ρABM ) ∈ CM . (75)
Let E and E˜ be purifying systems for ρABM and ρ˜ABM , respectively. Then the states
σZZ′ABME := (V ⊗ 1BME)ρABME(V † ⊗ 1BME) , and (76)
σ˜ZZ′ABME˜ := (V ⊗ 1BME˜)ρ˜ABME˜(V † ⊗ 1BME˜) (77)
are pure states. Here, V is an isometry that maps A→ ZZ ′A, defined by
V :=
∑
j
|j〉Z ⊗ |j〉Z′ ⊗
√
ZjA , (78)
where the set {ZjA} forms a POVM (Alice’s key-map POVM).
Let us take a moment to clarify the meaning of the conditional entropy H(Z|E). Note that, by convention, when we
casually refer to H(Z|E) for the state ρABME , we precisely mean the conditional von Neumann entropy of the state
σZZ′ABME , which we denote H(Z|E)σ. Typically one refers to σZZ′ABME as the post-measurement state associated
with a given (pre-measurement) state ρABME . Likewise H(Z|E˜) for the state ρ˜ABME˜ actually refers to the conditional
von Neumann entropy of σ˜ZZ′ABME˜ denoted by H(Z|E˜)σ˜.
The duality [46] of the von Neumann entropy says that H(A|B)τ = −H(A|C)τ for any tripartite pure state τABC .
Applying this duality relation to the pure state σZZ′ABME gives
H(Z|E)σ = −H(Z|Z ′ABM)σ (79)
> −H(Z|Z ′ABM)σ˜ (80)
= H(Z|E˜)σ˜ , (81)
where the inequality is due to the data-processing inequality, i.e., acting with channelM on M can never reduce the
entropy. Hence we have shown that Eve’s ignorance for the state ρ˜ABME˜ is not larger than her ignorance for the state
ρABME , which is the desired result.
Example: MDI QKD with BB84 states
Here we elaborate on how we obtain the data in Fig. 2. To obtain this data, we consider the most common MDI
protocol, where Alice and Bob each prepare and send the BB84 signal states {|0〉, |1〉, |+〉, |−〉} with probabilities pz/2
and (1 − pz)/2 respectively for the Z- and X-basis states. For simplicity we consider a protocol that does not do
sifting and distills key out of both the Z- and X-bases. This corresponds to choosing the key map as
Key-map POVM: ZA = {|0〉〈0|+ |2〉〈2|, |1〉〈1|+ |3〉〈3|} , (82)
where Alice’s source-replacement state from Eq. (12) is
|ψAA′〉 =
√
pz/2 (|0〉|0〉+ |1〉|1〉) +
√
(1− pz)/2 (|2〉|+〉+ |3〉|−〉) . (83)
To obtain large key rates we employ biased basis choices [34], i.e., pz = 1 −  with 0 <   1. As noted above, we
impose the correlation constraints in Supplementary Eq. (70) as well as constraints that fix the form of the marginals
ρA and ρB , Supplementary Eq. (71). It is encouraging that our numerics reproduce the known theoretical curve [32],
as shown in Fig. 2.
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SUPPLEMENTARY NOTE 2: ARBITRARY POST-SELECTION
In the Results section we discussed a method for transforming the constraints on ρAB to constraints on the post-
selected state G(ρAB) for the special case where G has a CP inverse. We now generalize the method to transform the
constraints for any CP map G.
The idea is to view the space of Hermitian operators as a vector space, and to partition the space into basis vectors
whose coefficients are fixed by the constraints and those whose coefficients are free. Namely, we apply this view to
the image space under post-selection, as follows.
By applying the Gram-Schmidt process to the measurement operators {Γi}, we can write the constraints on ρAB
equivalently as Tr(ρAB∆i) = δi where the {∆i} are orthonormal under the Frobenius inner product 〈A,B〉 = Tr(A†B).
We extend this to an orthonormal basis {∆i} ∪ {Ξj} of the Hermitian operator space. Note that here, and in what
follows, we take the basis elements to be Hermitian.
For clarity, in what follows we refer to the observation-based constraints on ρAB , which are generally of the form
Tr(ρABΓi) = γi, as trace constraints. This is to distinguish them from the constraints on ρAB due to its positivity.
Now define (~δ)i = δi and (~∆)i = ∆i, and similarly for ~ξ and ~Ξ. Then any ρAB satisfying the trace constraints is of
the form:
ρAB = ~δ · ~∆ + ~ξ · ~Ξ = ρ0 + ~ξ · ~Ξ, (84)
for any ~ξ. Note that the requirement that ρAB > 0 will constrain the possible values of ~ξ, but for now we only
consider the trace constraints. For later convenience, we have defined the (not necessarily positive semidefinite)
operator ρ0 := ~δ · ~∆.
Acting linearly with G, we find that the image of the set of ρAB satisfying the trace constraints is
G(ρAB) = G(ρ0) + ~ξ · G(~Ξ). (85)
Now, let {Υm} be an orthonormal basis for the space spanned by the operators {G(Ξj)}, which can again be found
by the Gram-Schmidt process. We can extend this to an orthonormal basis {Υm} ∪ {Ωn} of the image of the
original Hilbert space under G, i.e., G(HAB). In practice, this can be done by performing Gram-Schmidt again on
{Υm} ∪ {G(∆i)}, which will leave the Υm unchanged. The {Ωn} are the operators of interest. We can calculate the
coefficients ωn:
Tr(G(ρ0)Ωn) = ωn. (86)
With the basis decomposition G(ρAB) = ~ω · ~Ω + ~υ · ~Υ for some ~υ, it can be shown that the trace constraints on ρAB
do not constrain ~υ whatsoever. On the other hand, the coefficients in ~ω are exactly determined in Supplementary
Eq. (86). Thus, the trace constraints are exactly converted from ρAB to G(ρAB) according to:
{Tr(ρABΓi) = γi} ⇒ {Tr(G(ρAB)Ωn) = ωn}. (87)
Let us remark that the Hermitian operators in G(HAB) will be represented as matrices in a possibly larger space
H˜AB , where G(HAB) ⊆ H˜AB . One has the freedom to choose H˜AB for a convenient matrix representation of G(HAB),
and hence H˜AB is not unique. But if H˜AB is strictly larger, i.e., G(HAB) ⊂ H˜AB , then we must enforce additional trace
constraints, to restrict the optimization to G(HAB). To obtain these additional constraints, complete the orthonormal
basis {Υm} ∪ {Ωn} of G(HAB) to a basis of H˜AB with the additional orthonormal Hermitian operators {Λ`}. The
operators O ∈ H˜AB such that O ∈ G(HAB) are exactly those that satisfy Tr(OΛ`) = 0 for each `. Hence, one can add
the constraints {Tr(G(ρAB)Λ`) = 0} to the set in Supplementary Eq. (87). For future convenience, let us define the
set of positive operators in H˜AB as P˜AB := {ρ˜AB ∈ H˜AB : ρ˜AB > 0}.
With post-selection, the key rate formula in Eq. (1) is applied to the post-selected state G(ρAB)/ppass, with the
measured quantity ppass = Tr(G(ρAB)). (See the remark in the main text where we note that taking Eve’s system
to purify the post-selected state does not introduce any looseness into our key rate calculation.) In the usual primal
optimization, the optimization is taken over ρAB . However, we can directly reformulate it as an optimization over
ρ˜AB in G(PAB), the image of PAB under the post-selection map. Let B˜ be the set of ρ˜AB ∈ G(PAB) satisfying the
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trace constraints Tr(ρ˜ABΩn) = ωn for each n. Then the primal problem is:
α̂ = min
ρAB∈C
Φ̂
(G(ρAB)
ppass
, ZA
)
(88)
= min
ρAB∈C
min
σAB∈D
D̂
(G(ρAB)
ppass
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ZA(σAB)) (89)
=
α˜
ppass
− ln ppass , (90)
where
α˜ := min
ρ˜AB∈B˜
min
σAB∈D
D̂
(
ρ˜AB ||ZA(σAB)
)
. (91)
To apply our standard optimization algorithm, we need to optimize over a set of all positive semidefinite operators
in a Hilbert space. Since G is a CP map, G(PAB) ⊆ G(HAB)+, where G(HAB)+ is the set of positive semidefinite
operators in G(HAB). The inclusion need not be with equality, so we have the inequality:
α˜ ≥ min
ρ˜AB∈C˜
min
σAB∈D
D̂
(
ρ˜AB ||ZA(σAB)
)
, (92)
where C˜ is the set of ρ˜AB ∈ G(HAB)+ such that Tr(ρ˜ABΩn) = ωn for each n, or equivalently, the set of ρ˜AB ∈ P˜AB
such that Tr(ρ˜ABΩn) = ωn for each n and Tr(ρ˜ABΛ`) = 0 for each `. With the reformulation of the optimization
problem in Supplementary Eq. (92), we have (at the expense of introducing an inequality) recast the optimization
with post-selection into the usual form treated in the Methods section.
However, note that when G has an inverse G−1 that is CP, Supplementary Eq. (92) is satisfied with equality. This
follows from the fact that G(PAB) = G(HAB)+ in this case. This special case was discussed in the Results section.
Furthermore, we note that the B92 protocol (see Supplementary Note 4) involves a post-selection map that has a CP
inverse. So for that protocol, the step in Supplementary Eq. (92) does not introduce any looseness.
SUPPLEMENTARY NOTE 3: TIGHTNESS FOR PROTOCOLS WITH MUBS
Here we analytically prove Prop. 2. This states that our numerical approach is perfectly tight for the entanglement-
based protocols involving MUBs discussed in the main text.
First we note that the only potential source of looseness in our bound is our usage in Eq. (60) of the Golden-
Thompson (GT) inequality Eq. (59). The question, then, is under what conditions is Eq. (60) saturated.
A general lemma
We begin by stating a general lemma, which gives a sufficient set of criteria that guarantee our method is tight.
Note that these sufficient criteria might not be necessary for tightness.
Lemma 5: The GT inequality invoked in Eq. (60) is saturated, and hence our method tight, for a QKD protocol
satisfying the following two conditions:
(a) [Γi,Γi′ ] = 0 ∀ i, i′
(b) 〈e`|ZA(|ek〉〈ek|)|e`′〉 = 0 for ` 6= `′ and ∀k in a common eigenbasis {|ek〉} of all {Γi}.
Proof. In general, the GT inequality Eq. (59) is satisfied with equality if and only if the two operators commute. In
our case, the saturation of the GT inequality is equivalent to the vanishing of the following commutator[
Q(~λ), lnZA(σ∗AB)
]
, (93)
where Q(~λ) := −1 − ~λ · ~Γ, and where σ∗AB is a maximal eigenvector of
T := ZA
(
exp(Q(~λ))
)
= ZA
(
R(~λ)
)
, (94)
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i.e., an eigenvector of T whose eigenvalue is the largest. In general σ∗AB is not uniquely defined if the maximal
eigenvalue is degenerate. However, this issue does not affect the proof below. This is because, for tightness, we only
need the GT inequality to be saturated for one particular σ∗AB , i.e., one particular σAB that achieves the optimization
in Eq. (63).
As ZA(σ∗AB) is positive semidefinite, it can be shown that the vanishing of Supplementary Eq. (93), and thus the
saturation of the GT inequality, is equivalent to the vanishing of[
Q(~λ),ZA(σ∗AB)
]
. (95)
This follows from the fact that lnZA(σ∗AB) and ZA(σ∗AB) = exp(lnZA(σ∗AB)) are diagonal in the same basis.
Now suppose that conditions (a) and (b) are satisfied. It follows from (a) that the measurement operators {Γi} can
be simultaneously diagonalized in an orthonormal eigenbasis {|ek〉}. The operators Q(~λ) and R(~λ) = exp(Q(~λ)) are
also diagonal in such a basis.
From condition (b), we note that ZA maps an eigenstate |ek〉〈ek| to a linear combination of |e`〉〈e`| terms. Let the
coefficients of that combination be bk` and let the eigenvalues of R(~λ) be ak. Then T is also diagonalizable in the
{|ek〉} eigenbasis since
T =
∑
k
akZA(|ek〉〈ek|) =
∑
`
(∑
k
bk`ak
)
|e`〉〈e`|. (96)
Since σ∗AB is a maximal eigenvector of T , and T is diagonal in the {|ek〉} basis, then let us choose σ∗AB = |em〉〈em| to
correspond to a state |em〉 from this basis. While T may have more than one eigenbasis, we remark that we have the
freedom to choose σ∗AB from the {|ek〉} basis, since (as noted above) we only need the GT inequality to be saturated
for a particular choice of σ∗AB .
We find that Supplementary Eq. (95) vanishes:
[
Q(~λ),ZA(σ∗AB)
]
=
[
Q(~λ),
∑
`
bm`|e`〉〈e`|
]
=
∑
`
bm`
[
Q(~λ), |e`〉〈e`|
]
= 0 , (97)
and thus the GT inequality is saturated if conditions (a) and (b) are satisfied.
Specific protocols
We now show that conditions (a) and (b) in Supplementary Lemma 5 are satisfied for the protocols involving MUBs
in the main text.
First we define some notation. The generalized Pauli operators in dimension d are
σZ :=
∑
j
ωj |j〉〈j| (98)
σX :=
∑
j
|j + 1〉〈j| = FσZF † , (99)
with ω = e2pii/d. From these operators one can construct the Bell basis states {|φq,r〉}, i.e., a set of d2 orthonormal
states of the form
|φq,r〉 := 1 ⊗ σqXσrZ |φ0,0〉, with q, r ∈ {0, ..., d− 1} , (100)
where
|φ0,0〉 :=
∑
j
1√
d
|j〉|j〉 . (101)
Our proof of tightness will proceed by showing that the Γi operators of interest are all diagonal in the Bell basis
(Supplementary Eq. (100)), and furthermore that the Bell basis satisfies condition (b) in Supplementary Lemma 5.
Let us first show the latter, since it will be used repeatedly below.
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Lemma 6: The Bell basis {|φq,r〉} satisfies condition (b) in Supplementary Lemma 5. That is,
〈φ`,m|ZA(|φq,r〉〈φq,r|)|φ`′,m′〉 = 0, ∀(`,m) 6= (`′,m′) and ∀(q, r) . (102)
Proof. In all the protocols under consideration,
ZA = {|j〉〈j|}d−1j=0 (103)
is taken to be the standard basis on system A. Hence we can rewrite the action of the channel ZA on some operator
O as
ZA(O) =
∑
j
|j〉〈j|O|j〉〈j| (104)
=
1
d
∑
j,k,k′
ωj(k−k
′)|k〉〈k|O|k′〉〈k′| (105)
=
1
d
∑
j
σjZO(σ
j
Z)
† . (106)
Next note that |φ0,0〉 has the property
(O ⊗ 1 )|φ0,0〉 = (1 ⊗OT )|φ0,0〉 (107)
for some operator O, where T is the transpose in the standard basis. Hence we have
ZA(|φ0,0〉〈φ0,0|) = 1
d
∑
j
(σjZ ⊗ 1 )|φ0,0〉〈φ0,0|((σjZ)† ⊗ 1 ) (108)
=
1
d
∑
j
(1 ⊗ σjZ)|φ0,0〉〈φ0,0|(1 ⊗ (σjZ)†) . (109)
Finally, using the definition in Supplementary Eq. (100), we have
ZA(|φq,r〉〈φq,r|) = (1 ⊗ σqXσrZ)ZA(|φ0,0〉〈φ0,0|)(1 ⊗ σqXσrZ)† (110)
=
1
d
∑
j
(1 ⊗ σqXσr+jZ )|φ0,0〉〈φ0,0|(1 ⊗ σqXσr+jZ )† (111)
=
1
d
∑
j
|φq,r+j〉〈φq,r+j | . (112)
Clearly Supplementary Eq. (112) is diagonal in the Bell basis, proving the desired result.
Therefore, in the specific protocols considered below, we only need to show that the {Γi} operators are diagonal in
the Bell basis, to prove tightness of our method.
Two MUBs
First let us consider the protocol discussed in the main text involving only two MUBs in arbitrary dimension d.
Here the {Γi} operators are {1 , EZ , EX}, where we write the error operators as EZ = 1 − CZ and EX = 1 − CX ,
with
CZ :=
∑
j
|j〉〈j| ⊗ |j〉〈j| (113)
CX :=
∑
j
F |j〉〈j|F † ⊗ F †|j〉〈j|F. (114)
It suffices to show that CZ and CX are diagonal in the Bell basis. First, note that CZ is d times the quantity in
Supplementary Eq. (109), and hence
CZ =
d−1∑
r=0
|φ0,r〉〈φ0,r|, (115)
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which is obviously diagonal in the Bell basis. Next we write
CX = (F ⊗ F †)CZ(F † ⊗ F ) (116)
=
∑
r
(F ⊗ F †)|φ0,r〉〈φ0,r|(F † ⊗ F ) (117)
=
∑
r
(F ⊗ F †σrZ)|φ0,0〉〈φ0,0|(F † ⊗ (σrZ)†F ) (118)
=
∑
r
(1 ⊗ F †σrZF )|φ0,0〉〈φ0,0|(1 ⊗ F †(σrZ)†F ) (119)
=
∑
r
(1 ⊗ σd−rX )|φ0,0〉〈φ0,0|(1 ⊗ (σd−rX )†) (120)
=
∑
r
|φr,0〉〈φr,0| , (121)
where Supplementary Eq. (120) used the relation
F †σrZF = (Fσ
r
ZF
†)T = (σrX)
T = σd−rX . (122)
Clearly the final expression for CX is diagonal in the Bell basis. This proves that our numerical approach is tight for
the protocol discussed in Fig. 3 of the main text.
Six-state protocol
The six-state protocol (see Fig. 1) is a qubit protocol involving the operators {Γi} = {1 , EZ , EX +EY }. We already
showed that EZ and EX are diagonal in the Bell basis, so we just need to do the same for EY . Note that we can
write EY = (1 − σY ⊗ σY )/2, where σY := −i|0〉〈1| + i|1〉〈0|. So it suffices to show that σY ⊗ σY is diagonal in the
Bell basis. This follows from directly computing the action on the four Bell states:
σY ⊗ σY (|00〉 ± |11〉) = −(|11〉 ± |00〉) (123)
σY ⊗ σY (|01〉 ± |10〉) = (|10〉 ± |01〉) . (124)
Hence our method is tight for the six-state protocol.
n MUBs
The protocol considered in Fig. 4 involved n MUBs in d = 5. These MUBs were chosen based on a construction in
Ref. [35]. Namely, in prime dimension, the eigenvectors of the operators
σZ , σX , σXσZ , ..., σXσ
d−1
Z (125)
form a set of d+ 1 MUBs. In Fig. 4, we considered a subset of size n of the MUBs in Supplementary Eq. (125).
The measurement operators are:
{Γi} = {1 , EZ , EX + EXZ + ...+ EXZn−2} (126)
where EXZk denotes the error operator for the basis associated with σXσkZ .
We already showed above that EZ and EX are diagonal in the Bell basis, so it remains to show this for
EXZ , ..., EXZn−2 . Again let us use the notation
CXZk := 1 − EXZk (127)
= (Hk ⊗H∗k)CZ(Hk ⊗H∗k)† , (128)
where Hk is the Hadamard (unitary) matrix that rotates the standard basis to the eigenbasis of σXσkZ , and H
∗
k denotes
its conjugate in the standard basis.
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Consider the case where d is an odd prime. Note that the only even prime is d = 2 which we already covered above.
We restrict to odd primes here, since the following construction applies to them
Hk =
∑
j,j′
1√
d
ω−jj
′−ksj |j〉〈j′| (129)
where sj := (d− j)(d+ j − 1)/2.
Proceeding similarly to Supplementary Eq. (116), we write
CXZk =
∑
r
(Hk ⊗H∗k)|φ0,r〉〈φ0,r|(Hk ⊗H∗k)† (130)
=
∑
r
(Hk ⊗H∗kσrZ)|φ0,0〉〈φ0,0|(H†k ⊗ (σrZ)†HTk ) (131)
=
∑
r
(1 ⊗H∗kσrZHTk )|φ0,0〉〈φ0,0|(1 ⊗H∗k(σrZ)†HTk ) (132)
=
∑
r
(1 ⊗ σd−rX σkrZ )|φ0,0〉〈φ0,0|(1 ⊗ (σd−rX σkrZ )†) (133)
=
∑
r
|φd−r,kr〉〈φd−r,kr| , (134)
which is diagonal in the Bell basis. In Supplementary Eq. (133), we used
H∗kσ
r
ZH
T
k = ω
−kr(r+1)/2σd−rX σ
kr
Z , (135)
and noted that the phase factor ω−kr(r+1)/2 disappears when multiplied by its conjugate.
SUPPLEMENTARY NOTE 4: ANALYSIS OF B92 PROTOCOL
Here we elaborate on our analysis of the B92 protocol. Recall that Alice sends one of two non-orthogonal states
{|φ0〉, |φ1〉} to Bob, and Bob randomly measures either in basis B0 = {|φ0〉, |φ0〉} or basis B1 = {|φ1〉, |φ1〉}, where
〈φ0|φ0〉 = 〈φ1|φ1〉 = 0. They post-select on rounds where Bob gets outcome |φ0〉 or |φ1〉.
Since this is a prepare-and-measure protocol, we use the source-replacement scheme as outlined in the Results
section. That is, Alice and Bob obtain constraints on the state ρAB in Eq. (13). The optimization problem is then
defined as follows
Key-map POVM: ZA = {|0〉〈0|, |1〉〈1|} (136)
Constraints: 〈1 〉 = 1 (137)
〈Γ1〉 = p/2 (138)
〈Γ2〉 = p/2 + (1− p) sin2(θ/2) (139)
〈σX ⊗ 1 〉 = cos(θ/2) (140)
Post-selection: G = 1A ⊗
[
1
2
(|φ0〉〈φ0|+ |φ1〉〈φ1|)]1/2 . (141)
Here, p is the depolarizing probability, σX = |0〉〈1|+ |1〉〈0|, and the error and success operators are respectively
Γ1 := |0〉〈0| ⊗ |φ0〉〈φ0|+ |1〉〈1| ⊗ |φ1〉〈φ1| (142)
Γ2 := |0〉〈0| ⊗ |φ1〉〈φ1|+ |1〉〈1| ⊗ |φ0〉〈φ0| . (143)
Note that the constraint in Supplementary Eq. (140) serves to constrain ρA and is of the form of Eq. (15) (see
discussion around Eq. (14)). In principle one can add additional constraints on ρA, although we found this did not
affect the key rate. In addition to the key map and constraints, note that we also needed to define the filter associated
with Bob’s post-selection; see Eq. (18) in the Results section. Here we wrote the post-selection map in Kraus form:
G(O) = GOG† for any operator O.
Supplementary Eqs. (136)-(141) define the optimization problem, and our results are shown in Fig. 6. We remark
that our formulation of the dual problem has only 4 parameters, whereas the primal problem has 12 parameters,
making the latter somewhat more difficult to solve.
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SUPPLEMENTARY NOTE 5: ARBITRARY KEY-MAP POVMS
The Methods section proves our main result for the case where the key-map POVM is a projective measurement.
Here we generalize this proof to arbitrary measurements.
First we rewrite the primal problem in terms of a coherence-like quantity, similar to what we did in the Methods
section. Consider some POVM P = {Pj} with Pj > 0 for each j, and
∑
j Pj = 1 . Let us first define a generalized
notion of coherence as follows,
ΦG(ρ, P ) := D
(
ρ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∑
j
PjρPj
)
. (144)
We note that the second argument
∑
j PjρPj is not necessarily normalized, although in general we have
Tr(
∑
j PjρPj) 6 1, which follows from P 2j 6 Pj . In turn, this implies that ΦG is non-negative:
ΦG(ρ, P ) > 0 . (145)
Suppose Alice’s measurement is an arbitrary POVM, ZA = {ZjA}. Then, from Lemma 4 of Ref. [41], we have:
H(ZA|E) > ΦG(ρAB , ZA) (146)
where E can be taken to purify ρAB . Hence we can define (or lower bound) the primal problem as
α := min
ρAB∈C
ΦG(ρAB , ZA) , (147)
which is analogous to Eq. (43).
One can then transform to the dual problem, as described in the Methods section. The only subtlety is that the
analog of Eq. (50) can be written as an inequality:
Φ̂G(ρAB , ZA) = D̂
(
ρAB ||ZA(ρAB)
)
(148)
> min
σAB∈D
D̂
(
ρAB ||ZA(σAB)
)
. (149)
The rest of the derivation proceeds as described in the Methods section.
SUPPLEMENTARY NOTE 6: STRONG DUALITY
In general the dual problem gives a lower bound on the primal problem, a fact called weak duality [16]. In the
notation used in the Methods section, this means that
β̂ 6 α̂ . (150)
However, under certain conditions, the dual and primal problems are equivalent, which is called strong duality. Here
we show that strong duality holds for our problem. That is, we prove Eq. (48), β̂ = α̂.
Slater’s condition for a convex optimization problem is a sufficient criterion that guarantees strong duality [16]. For
a problem with affine constraints, Slater’s condition is satisfied when there is an element of the relative interior of the
domain of optimization that satisfies the constraints. Thus, one way to guarantee strong duality for our problem is
to show that there is a ρAB satisfying the constraints in Eq. (5) such that ρAB > 0. However, it is easy to imagine
examples where Alice’s and Bob’s constraints specify a 0 eigenvalue for ρAB . For such examples, one would not satisfy
Slater’s condition, since there would be no ρAB > 0 consistent with the constraints.
We get around this issue as follows. We show that by slightly perturbing the constraints in a physical way, we can
arrive at a “perturbed” problem which does satisfy Slater’s condition and thus strong duality. Intuitively, changing
the constraints infinitesimally should not change the solution to the primal problem by more than an infinitesimal
amount; we prove this formally using the continuity of the coherence (see Supplementary Lemma 8 below). Thus
solving the dual optimization (i.e., solving for β̂) can be done for slightly perturbed constraints, giving a solution
arbitrarily close, and hence equivalent for all practical purposes, to the solution of the primal problem, α̂. It is in this
sense that we have strong duality in Eq. (48).
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(For simplicity, we drop the subscript AB on ρAB for the remainder of this section, and just write ρ. Also, we
assume that the {ZjA} are projectors, and we replace ZA = {ZjA} with a generic set of projectors Π = {Πj}.)
More precisely, we consider the following two optimization problems
Problem 1: a1 = min
ρ∈S1
Φ(ρ,Π) (151)
Problem 2: a2(ε) = min
ρ∈S2(ε)
Φ(ρ,Π) (152)
where one should recall that the primal problem objective function was identified in Eq. (43) as the coherence Φ.
Here,
S1 := {ρ ∈ Hd : ρ > 0,Tr(ρ~Γ) = ~γ}
S2(ε) := {ρ ∈ Hd : ρ > 0,Tr(ρ~Γ) = (1− dε)~γ + εTr(~Γ)}.
We call Supplementary Eq. (151) the unperturbed problem and Supplementary Eq. (152) the perturbed problem. In
Supplementary Propositions 7 and 11, we shall prove that strong duality holds for the perturbed problem and that
lim
ε→0+
a2(ε) = a1. (153)
By choosing ε sufficiently small, solving the dual perturbed problem will then yield a result that is arbitrarily close
to the solution to the primal problem.
Proposition 7: The strong duality property holds for the perturbed problem.
Proof. We prove this by showing that Slater’s condition is satisfied for the perturbed primal problem, which implies
strong duality for the perturbed problem [16]. Slater’s condition for this convex optimization problem with affine
constraints is satisfied when there is a ρ > 0 that satisfies the constraints.
We begin by considering a map from the domain S1 to S2(ε). Let the mapMε act on a state ρ via
Mε(ρ) = (1− dε)ρ+ ε1 . (154)
Note that if ρ ∈ S1, thenMε(ρ) ∈ S2(ε).
We take the given set of constraints to be physical, i.e., S1 is non-empty. By the mapMε, S2(ε) is non-empty as
well. Then, as ρ > 0 for all ρ ∈ S2(ε), Slater’s condition is satisfied.
Before proving the continuity of the perturbation, we note that coherence Φ has some nice properties. One property
that we will make explicit use of is its continuity in the state ρ, which we prove in the following lemma. After completion
of this work, Ref. [47] proved the same lemma in their article.
Lemma 8: Let ρ and σ be two density operators on a Hilbert space of dimension d. Suppose they are close in trace
distance T (τ, τ ′) := (1/2)Tr|τ − τ ′|, in particular, suppose T (ρ, σ) 6 1/e. Then the coherences of ρ and σ are nearly
equal:
∆Φ := |Φ(ρ,Π)− Φ(σ,Π)|
6 2[T (ρ, σ) log2 d− T (ρ, σ) log2 T (ρ, σ)]. (155)
Proof. The proof uses Fannes’ inequality, which states that
|H(ρ)−H(σ)| 6 T (ρ, σ) log2 d− T (ρ, σ) log2 T (ρ, σ), (156)
which holds so long as T (ρ, σ) 6 1/e. Note that, because of the monotonicity of the trace distance under quantum
channels, we also have T (ρΠ, σΠ) 6 1/e, where ρΠ =
∑
j Π
jρΠj and σΠ =
∑
j Π
jσΠj . Hence Supplementary Eq. (156)
also holds for the states ρΠ and σΠ.
Noting that log ρΠ =
∑
j Π
j(log ρΠ)Π
j , we have
H(ρΠ) = −Tr(ρ log ρΠ),
and hence we can rewrite the coherence as
Φ(ρ,Π) = H(ρΠ)−H(ρ).
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This allows us to bound the coherence difference:
∆Φ = |H(ρΠ)−H(σΠ) +H(σ)−H(ρ)| (157)
6 |H(ρΠ)−H(σΠ)|+ |H(σ)−H(ρ)| (158)
6 T (ρΠ, σΠ) log2 d− T (ρΠ, σΠ) log2 T (ρΠ, σΠ) + T (ρ, σ) log2 d− T (ρ, σ) log2 T (ρ, σ) (159)
6 2[T (ρ, σ) log2 d− T (ρ, σ) log2 T (ρ, σ)], (160)
where the last line uses T (ρΠ, σΠ) 6 T (ρ, σ), as well as the monotonicity of (−x log x) over the interval x ∈ [0, 1/e].
To prove Supplementary Eq. (153), we first state the following two technical lemmas.
Lemma 9: There exists a ρ ∈ S2(ε) such that Φ(ρ,Π) is within O(ε) of the unperturbed solution, a1.
Proof. Let ρ ∈ S1 be a positive semidefinite matrix that minimizes the unperturbed problem, i.e.,
a1 = Φ(ρ,Π) . (161)
Consider the corresponding positive definite matrixMε(ρ) ∈ S2(ε), whereMε : S1 → S2(ε) is the injection defined in
Supplementary Eq. (154). We argue that this injection does not change the objective function much, due to continuity
of coherence. Note that the states ρ andMε(ρ) are close in trace distance:
T (ρ,Mε(ρ)) = dεT (ρ, 1 /d) 6 dε . (162)
From Supplementary Eq. (155) we have that
|Φ(ρ,Π)− Φ(Mε(ρ),Π)| 6 −2dε log2 ε , (163)
which proves the statement.
Lemma 10: There exists a ρ ∈ S1 such that Φ(ρ,Π) is within O(ε) of the perturbed solution, a2(ε).
Proof. As in Supplementary Note 2, we consider the trace constraints rephrased (via the Gram-Schmidt process) in
terms of an orthonormal set of operators {∆i}, i.e.,
Tr(ρ~Γ) = ~γ → Tr(ρ~∆) = ~δ , (164)
and we extend the set to an orthonormal basis of Hermitian operators:
{∆i} ∪ {Ξj} . (165)
For ρ1 ∈ S1 and ρ2 ∈ S2(ε), the most general expressions for these states are:
ρ1 = ~δ · ~∆ + ~ξ1 · ~Ξ (166)
ρ2 = (~δ + ~p) · ~∆ + ~ξ2 · ~Ξ, (167)
where ~ξ1 is any vector that enforces the positive semidefiniteness of ρ1 and ~ξ2 is any vector that enforces the positive
definiteness of ρ2. In Supplementary Eq. (167), we used the fact that the constraint perturbation from the unperturbed
problem in Supplementary Eq. (151) to the perturbed problem in Supplementary Eq. (152) takes the form ~δ → ~δ+ ~p,
with ~p := ε~p0, and
~p0 := Tr(~∆)− d~δ. (168)
In what follows, we study the geometry of the set of possible ~ξ1 and ~ξ2, thereby finding the most general form for
ρ1 and ρ2.
For all states |i〉 in the Hilbert space H, the positive (semi)definiteness requirements are equivalent to the following
statements, for all |i〉
〈i|ρ1|i〉 = ~δ · 〈i|~∆|i〉+ ~ξ1 · 〈i|~Ξ|i〉 ≥ 0 (169)
〈i|ρ2|i〉 = (~δ + ~p) · 〈i|~∆|i〉+ ~ξ2 · 〈i|~Ξ|i〉 > 0. (170)
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Define the infinite-dimensional operators C and D with (C)ij := 〈i|(~Ξ)j |i〉 and (D)ij := 〈i|(~∆)j |i〉. Then the ~ξ which
enforce the positive (semi)definiteness requirements are those which satisfy the following infinite vector of inequalities
C · ~ξ1 ≥ −D · ~δ = ~s (171)
C · ~ξ2 > −D · ~δ − εD · ~p0 = ~s+ ε~t , (172)
where the right sides are fixed quantities, so we defined ~s := −D · ~δ and ~t := −D · ~p0.
For each |i〉, the solution space of ~ξ1 and ~ξ2 satisfying the inequality constraint is a hyperplane defined by
Ci1
(
~ξ1
)
1
+ Ci2
(
~ξ1
)
2
+ · · · ≥ si (173)
Ci1
(
~ξ2
)
1
+ Ci2
(
~ξ2
)
2
+ · · · > si + εti. (174)
The regions of all possible ~ξ1 and ~ξ2 are the intersections of all of the constrained regions, each bounded by a
hyperplane. Since S1 and S2(ε) are non-empty, the solution sets for ~ξ1 and ~ξ2 are non-empty. Perturbing the
constraints is equivalent to shifting each hyperplane slightly (by εti for the ith hyperplane). For sufficiently small ε,
each ~ξ2 in the perturbed solution set is within O(ε) in Euclidean distance of a ~ξ1 in the unperturbed solution set [48].
Now, let ρˆ2 ∈ S2(ε) be a positive definite matrix that minimizes the perturbed problem, i.e.,
a2(ε) = Φ(ρˆ2,Π) . (175)
In terms of the basis in Supplementary Eq. (165),
ρˆ2 = (~δ + ε~p0) · ~∆ + ~ˆξ2 · ~Ξ , (176)
for a vector ~ˆξ2 that enforces positive definiteness for ρˆ2.
By the previous discussion, there exist a ~ˆξ1 which enforces positive semidefiniteness for a matrix satisfying the
unperturbed trace constraints that is within O(ε) of ~ˆξ2. That is, the vector
~v :=
~ˆ
ξ2 − ~ˆξ1 (177)
has a norm |~v| that is O(ε), and hence each component of ~v is no larger in magnitude than O(ε). We define
ρˆ1 := ~δ · ~∆ + ~ˆξ1 · ~Ξ ∈ S1. (178)
The difference between Supplementary Eqs. (176) and (178)
ρˆ2 − ρˆ1 = ε~p0 · ~∆ + ~v · ~Ξ (179)
has trace norm O(ε), as it is a sum of Hermitian operators with coefficients that are O(ε). Hence we have constructed
an element ρˆ1 ∈ S1 that is within O(ε) in trace distance of ρˆ2. Then by continuity of coherence in Supplementary
Lemma 8, the objective function value Φ(ρˆ1,Π) is within O(ε) of a2(ε).
Proposition 11: For a1, a2(ε) defined in Supplementary Eqs. (151) and (152),
lim
ε→0+
a2(ε) = a1. (180)
Proof. Supplementary Lemma 9 implies that
lim
ε→0+
a2(ε) 6 a1 . (181)
Supplementary Lemma 10 implies that
lim
ε→0+
a2(ε) > a1 . (182)
Combining these two facts gives the desired result.
